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WASHINGTON TIMBER DEEDS AND CONTRACTS
RALPH W. JOHNSON*
The law of Washington concerning the interests conveyed by timber
deeds and contracts is foggy. Many vital questions are still totally
unanswered, or have been left in confusion, by the cases in point. The
principal area of doubt revolves around the question of whether stand-
ing timber, which has been sold separately from the land on which it
stands, is realty or personalty. The answer is vital for many reasons.
It determines whether a husband has power as manager of the com-
munity to convey community-owned timber without his wife's signa-
ture, which statute of frauds applies to a timber transaction, which
recording or filing statutes apply, which laws of descent control upon
the death of one of the parties to the transaction, and whether a judg-
ment filed in the county in which the timber is located automatically
constitutes a lien against it.'
A prior article in this law review' analyzed the status of standing
timber with regard to established real and personal property concepts.
This paper will examine the Washington cases and statutes to demon-
strate how our supreme court has actually classified standing timber
in litigation.
It is not surprising to note that a wide variety of interests can be
conveyed by timber deeds and contracts. However, the consequences
that flow from such conveyances often are surprising. In Washington,
standing timber owned by the owner of the real property upon which
it is growing has always been regarded as real property.3 However, in
many instances the draftsman of a timber deed or contract can only
guess whether the timber, upon execution of the timber deed or con-
tract of sale, remains realty or in some magical way suddenly becomes
personal property. He may have to make an even less reliable guess
to determine if and when the timber reverts to the status of realty.
A brief examination of the key Washington cases on a somewhat
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
'Other illustrations of the significance of this classification are: if the timber is
considered personalty then 1) a conditional sale of it would be covered by RCW
63.12.010 concerning the filing of conditional sales contracts; 2) RCW 65.08.040 (record-
ing bills of sale) would apply to such a sale of timber; 3) the statute of limitations
for conversion of personal property would presumably apply in adverse possession
cases, instead of the statute of limitations re wrongful possession of realty.
2 Luccock, Timber Deeds-A Case For The Restatement of The Law of Property 20
WAsH. L. REv. 199 (1945).
3 Engleson v. Port Crescent Shingle Co. 74 Wash. 424, 133 Pac. 1030 (1913), France
v. Deep River Logging Co. 79 Wash. 336, 140 Pac. 361 (1914).
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chronological basis will show the origin and development of the Wash-
ington law in this area and by pointing out certain problems, may assist
the draftsman in avoiding unnecessary litigation.
The first significant case in Washington on the classification of
standing timber as realty or personalty is Brodack v. Morsbach.' In
March of 1891, one John Bannse contracted to sell certain standing
timber to Morsbach. The contract provided that John Bannse agreed
to sell to the Morsbaches
... all the mill timber situated on the following described land for their
use and benefit... [description] ... And it is further agreed that there
is no specified time in which said timber shall be removed.5
In September 1892, Augustus Bannse executed a deed to the realty
containing the timber to Brodack, the plaintiff. No deed from John
Bannse to Augustus Bannse was recorded during this period. However,
Brodack took the deed from Augustus Bannse with actual notice of
Morsbach's interest. A dispute arose between Brodack and Morsbach
concerning ownership of the timber. Brodack finally brought action
to quiet title to the real property, including the timber. The supreme
court affirmed judgment for the defendant Morsbach, rendered after
a trial without a jury. In a per curiam opinion the court said the
transaction in March 1891 between John Bannse and Morsbach was a
sale, not an agreement to sell, and that upon the execution and delivery
of the contract of sale:
... the timber became personal property, and the only interest the
defendants had, or could claim, in the land upon which the timber stood
was an implied license to enter and remove the timber. The appellants
(plaintiffs) purchased the land after this contract was made, and with
full knowledge thereof, and, therefore, they acquired no interest in the
timber by their purchase, except the right to have the timber revert to
them, in case it was not removed under the contract of sale.6
From the quoted language one might have been led to believe that a
"sale" of standing timber constructively severed it from the realty
and caused it to become personalty." However, such a belief would
have been short-lived in view of the language of France v. Deep River
Logging Co.' which was decided a few years later.9
'38 Wash. 72, 80 Pac. 275 (1905).
5 Id. at 73, 80 Pac. at 275.6 Id. at 74, 80 Pac. at 276.
7This interpretation of the Brodack case finds support in the case of Heybrook v.
Beard 75 Wash. 646, 135 Pac. 626 (1913).
8 79 Wash. 336, 140 Pac. 361 (1914.
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In the France case, the court held that the determination in the
Brodack case (that the standing timber was changed to personal prop-
erty by the sale) was "wholly unnecessary to be decided in disposing
of the case as the court did."1 The deed in the France case contained
the following clause:
... [g] rant, bargain, sell and convey unto... [purchaser] ... his heirs,
personal representatives and assigns, all timber... and the right of
entering upon said land and removing said timber .... To have and to
hold the said granted property and privileges... forever.1
This deed was executed in 1892, and was followed by a deed in 1902
from the first purchaser (Mooers) to the Deep River Logging Co.,
defendant. This latter deed contained substantially the same language.
In 1907, the plaintiff bought the realty in question on a tax sale. In
1910 and 1911, the defendant, apparently believing it still owned the
timber by virtue of the deed to it in 1902, cut certain of the timber.
Plaintiff brought this action of trespass claiming title to the timber
through the tax sale.
The court declined to decide whether timber generally would become
personalty if the deed of conveyance contained a stated time for
removal, but held that this timber did not become personalty, because
the grantee had a right to remove the timber "forever" (which included
"a hundred years hence")."2 The court concluded that this right must,
therefore, be a real property interest. The court said:
9 In the meantime the court decided Lehtonen v. Marysville Water & Power Co. 50
Wash. 359, 97 Pac. 292 (1908) where the grantor of certain real estate reserved the
timber thereon and the right of removal for 2 years. After the 2-year period had
expired, the grantor contended the timber was his and that he still had the right to
remove it. However the court held otherwise, saying that upon the termination of the
time reserved for cutting, the timber reverted to the owner of the land, the grantee.
The court said that it was immaterial for this purpose whether the timber was classified
as real or personal property; the controlling factor was the intent of the parties. In 1913
the case of Engleson v. Port Crescent Shingle Co. 74 Wash. 424, 133 Pac. 1030 (1913)
was decided in which the plaintiff sued for commissions allegedly due him for the sale
of certain standing timber. The timber was growing partly on the land of the defendant
and partly on the lands of third parties. The court had before it the question whether the
case was controlled by RCW 19.36.010 (5), the statute requiring that an agreement to pay
a commission on the sale of real property must be in writing. This question turned on
whether the standing timber was real or personal property. In view of the language
quoted above from the Brodack case, one might effectively argue that the timber
owned by the defendant and located on the land of the third parties was personalty.
However, the question was not raised in the opinion.10 France v. Deep River Logging Co. 79 Wash. 336, 341, 140 Pac. 361, 362 (1914).
11 Id. at 338, 140 Pac. at 361.
12 Id. at 344, 140 Pac. at 363. A number of additional questions are raised by the
"forever" type of timber grant. These questions will be considered in a later portion
of this article.
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The right to the timber was so connected with the continuing right to
enter upon the land as to not be severable one from the other, except by
the actual physical removal of the timber, thereby putting an end to
the right of entry.'3
Two additional grounds were stated in support of the ruling that
the timber remained realty: (1) the intent of the parties, as evidenced
by the fact that (a) 17 years passed before the grantee attempted to
remove any timber, (b) the grantee apparently never considered the
timber personalty for tax purposes, because he never paid taxes on it
as such, and (2) a "presumption"; the court said, "viewed in its
physical aspect alone, it is real property and will be presumed to be
such until clearly shown to be otherwise."'"
The difference in the type of grant in the France and Brodack cases
is marked. One might argue that if the language in the Brodack case
about timber being personalty was dicta, so also was the criticism
thereof in the France case. However, the France case does hold clearly
that timber sold with the right of removal "forever" remains realty,
particularly when the intent of the parties, otherwise indicated, sup-
ports such a construction. 5
In Cross v. Churchill" the contract in question stated that the
seller "sells and delivers" all the merchantable timber on certain
described land, reserving for the seller the piles, poles and shingle
bolts. The timber was to be removed within two years from the date
of the contract, or within an additional period of time if certain condi-
tions were met. The court considered this timber to be personalty and
discussed the issues in the case in relation to the rules governing sales
of personal property." It held that title never passed to the purchaser
2
3 1d. at 345, 140 Pac. at 364.
'4 Id. at 344, 140 Pac. at 364. However, the statement immediately preceding this
quotation makes unclear whether the court was speaking generally or only in relation
to the tax problem.
15 It is interesting to note that in 1 TnPANY, REAL PROPERTY 881 (2d ed. 1920) the
author cites the France case in support of the statement that "it has been decided that,
upon a conveyance by the landowner of growing trees apart from the land' they become
personalty." The author then (p.882, n. 77) indicates that a constructive severance
occurs in Washington only when there is "some limitation of time within which the
grantee might remove the trees." But in 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 62 (rev. ed. 1948), the
author cites the France case in support of the statement "the courts of most of the
American States that have considered the question have held expressly that a sale of
growing or standing timber is a contract concerning an interest in land."
16 122 Wash. 374, 210 Pac. 776 (1922).
27Although the court never stated in so many words that the timber was personal
property, the language throughout the opinion leaves little doubt but that it considered
the timber such, e.g., the court said: "The question as to when title passes to the
vendee of personal property which is to be separated from a mass depends upon the
intention of the parties. This court has long ago committed itself to the doctrine that,
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under the contract, because there was never a segregation of the
"merchantable""8 timber from the piles, poles and shingle bolts. In
assuming that the timber in this case was personal property, the court
clearly appears to have been in error. At the time of the sale the title
to the timber, and the real property upon which it stood, were in the
same person and thus the timber was necessarily real property. 9 Cer-
tainly its status could not change before it was segregated and appro-
priated to the contract, because prior to that time title to both timber
and land remained in the seller. However, one may observe that the
assumption that the timber was personal property may not have been
necessary to the decision. The rules regarding segregation and appro-
priation have also been applied to real property. 0 "Appropriation"
ordinarily need not be accomplished in any particular manner as long
as the act of appropriation is clear.2 In a case such as Cross v.
Churchill it could probably be accomplished by marking the trees,
e.g., by blazes, and would not mean necessarily that they must be
severed from the soil.
where a certain amount of personal property from a larger mass, where all the different
portions are not of equal quality or value, is contracted to be sold, title does not pass
before segregation has been made, as it is impossible before that time to determine
exactly what is included in the sale." Id. at 376, 210 Pac. at 777.
Furthermore, the five cases cited, and discussed as controlling, all involved personal
property. No mention was made of the Brodack or France cases. In this regard it is
interesting to note that much the same question concerning lack of segregation could
have been raised in the Brodack case where the contract purported to sell ".. . all the
mill timber...". Until it was cut or marked there certainly was no segregation. How-
ever, the question apparently was not raised in the case.
18 Although the term "merchantable" is frequently used in conveyances of standing
timber, it cannot be said that the term has a precise or generally agreed meaning. Much
depends upon the locality of the timber, the business of the parties, and the then existing
methods of manufacture. Hughes v. Heppner Lumber Co. 205 Or. 11, 283 P.2d 142.
Rehearing denied 286 P2d 126 (1955).
19 France v. Deep River Logging Co. 79 Wash. 336, 140 Pac. 361 (1914).
20 See Skate Creek Logging Co. v. Fletcher 46 Wn2d 160, 278 P.2d 1009 (1955)
where, in an opinion by Judge Mallery, the 2d department applied the rule re appro-
priation to a contract for the sale of certain standing timber, which was there consid-
ered to be real property. See also Carpenter v. Ferrell 99 N.C. 495, 499, 6 S.E. 785,
787 (1888).
The doctrine of subsequent appropriation is based on reason and common sense. It
would seem to apply as well to the real property field as to personal property. See
2 WILLISToN, SALES § 258 (rev. ed. 1948).
But cf. the Oregon case of Seguin v. Maloney-Chambers 198 Or. 272, 253 P.2d 252
(1953) where the Oregon court held that a deed which purported to convey three and
one-half million feet of merchantable timber on certain described land created an undi-
vided interest in the timber in the grantee. The court likened this deed to a conveyance
of part of a large parcel of land without designating which part is conveyed. Such a
conveyance usually creates an undivided interest in the whole tract. Justice Perry, the
writer of the opinion, seemed to believe that if the instrument in question did not imme-
diately convey an undivided interest it would be void for uncertainty. The Seguin case
was criticized in Note, 33 O. L. REv. 301 (1954) and Comment, 34 ORE. L. REv. 256
(1955).
212 WILLISTo, SALES § 273a (rev. ed. 1948).
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Other than certain dicta in two cases, in 192822 and 1932,23 there
appear to be no further Washington cases classifying timber as realty
or personalty until Elmonte Investment Co. v. Schafer Bros. Logging
Co.2 There was, however, in 1929, one federal case that considered
the question, the court there holding that a conveyance of standing
timber to be removed within a reasonable time was a conveyance of
realty.2 5
In the Elmonte case, one Clemons and wife sold all the merchantable
timber on certain land to the Wynooche Timber Co., which then
assigned the contract to Schafer Brothers Logging Company. The
contract was duly recorded. It provided that the buyers had seven
years to remove the timber. Thereafter Clemons and wife mortgaged
the land to the Elmonte Investment Company to secure money due on
a promissory note. The mortgage did not except the timber or any
interest therein. This instrument was also duly recorded. Clemons and
wife then, for a valuable consideration, extended the time for Schafer
Bros. Logging Co. to remove the timber. The Clemonses defaulted on
their note and Elmonte Investment Company brought this action to
foreclose the mortgage. Schafer Bros. Logging Co. contended its exten-
2' McFadden v. Allen-Nelson Mill Co. 150 Wash. 249, 257, 272 Pac. 714, 717 (1928).
The timber buyer was granted a right to cut the timber within 5 years, and such longer
time as might be needed, on payment of $10.00 each year. Held: that the grantee may
extend the time for cutting only for a reasonable time. Twenty years was an unrea-
sonable time. Inter alia, the court said ".. . the grantor, in contracting for the sale of
the timber, had granted an interest in his land for five years and so much longer as
might be needed for the removal of the timber and a right of way for a logging rail-
road." (emphasis supplied)
The court in Elmonte Investment Co. v. Schafer Bros. Logging Co. 192 Wash. 1,
72 P.2d 311 (1937) seems to use the above quoted language in support of the proposi-
tion that standing timber that has been sold remains realty. However, neither the quota-
tion nor the case lend much support to this argument. Certainly a grantor of standing
timber with the right to cut for a period of years grants an interest in his land, even if
the conveyance is construed to work a constructive severance. The grantee in any
event gets an easement or license to come upon the land to cut and remove the timber.
This is an interest in the land. Furthermore the timber itself was realty in the hands
of the grantor, and the conveyance may be one of realty as to the grantor, whether or not
the timber becomes personalty in the hands of the grantee.
28 State Finance Co. v. Hamacher 171 Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610 (1932). The Province
of British Columbia issued timber licenses to A. W. Codd and others, authorizing them
to cut and carry away certain cedar poles standing on public lands. A. W. Codd con-
tracted with Hamacher, the defendant, for the latter to cut and remove the "merchant-
able" poles and to pay Codd etc. 50 cents per pole. The 1929 economic crisis intervened
and Hamacher breached his agreement whereupon Codd etc. assigned their interest in
the contract to the plaintiff who brought this action for damages. The supreme court
affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. In the course of the opinion the somewhat aston-
ishing (and uncalled for) statement was made, "This is a contract for the sale of per-
sonal property." (Id. at 23, 17 P.2d at 614). As the result would have been the same
whether the contract covered either real or personal property, the above statement
appears clearly to be dictum, and useless.
24 192 Wash. 1, 72 P.2d 311 (1937).
25 Milwaukee Land Co. v. Poe 31 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1929). The circuit court relied
on the France case in making this determination.
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sion agreement was valid as against the mortgagee's interest on the
ground, inter alia, that the timber was converted to personal property
by the initial sale and thus the defendant could not be charged with con-
structive notice of any attempted mortgaging of the "possibility of
reverter" by the recording of a real estate mortgage by plaintiff.
In the supreme court, Judge Millard treated the defendant's argu-
ment rather extensively, citing many authorities and arguments, and
concluded as follows:
Standing trees are real estate unless they have been sold with the
intention of an immediate severance from the soil. 2 0
We are committed to the rule that a conveyance of standing timber,
with the right of entry upon the land and removal of the timber there-
from in the future, whether the time of removal be measured by stated
or reasonable time, is the conveyance of an interest in real property.21
The court then held that, as the timber was realty at all times con-
cerned, Schafer Bros. Logging Co. was put on notice of the Elmonte
Inv. Co. mortgage by the recording thereof." This case will be dis-
cussed infra.
One recent case, Coleman v. Layman,2 remains for consideration.
Certain standing timber had been sold by plaintiff to defendant by
deed. Plaintiff contended that the deed contained certain language
which created a "condition" to defendant's continued ownership of
the timber. Plaintiff further contended that the defendant had breached
this condition, and that the title to the timber thus had reverted to
the plaintiff. When the defendant thereafter cut and removed some
of the timber, the plaintiff brought this action of trespass. The second
department, per Olson, J. held that the language in question consti-
tuted a covenant, not a condition, and that the breach thereof by the
defendant did not cause the title to the timber to revert to the seller.
The court indicated that the plaintiff might have a cause of action for
other relief against the defendant, i.e., for breach of the covenant, but
28 Elmonte Inv. Co. v. Schafer Bros. Logging Co. 192 Wash. 1, 21, 72 P.2d 311, 320
(1937).
27 Id. at 22, 72 P.2d at 320. Implicit in this statement seems to be the conclusion that
if the parties intend an immediate severance, the instrument is not a conveyance of an
interest in land but in personal property.
Compare this rule with that in landlord and tenant law that rent already due, and
thus payable immediately, is personalty, whereas rent to come due in the future is con-
sidered realty. Kneeland Inv. Co. v. Aldrich 63 Wash. 609, 116 Pac. 264 (1911).
280ne might ask whether the whole discussion re timber as real or personal prop-
erty is dicta in this case. In its decision the court implies that if the timber becomes
personal property by the conveyance the "possibility of reverter" in the grantor is also
personal property. But does this necessarily follow?
2941 Wn.2d 753, 252 P.2d 244 (1953).
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did not have any standing in court in this action of trespass. The court
then generalized (gratuitously) as follows:
Growing timber can be conveyed separately from the land on which it
grows. Such a conveyance, with the right to enter upon the land and
remove the timber in the future, either within a stated or a reasonable
time, is the conveyance of an interest in realty and is properly done by
deed."
However the court expressly declined to state the nature of the interest
conveyed.
We need not, and do not, decide the exact nature of the estate vested in
defendants by the deed in this case. It possibly may be said to have the
characteristics of a determinable estate, with a possibility of reverter in
plaintiffs, subject to a special limitation, rather than of an estate subject
to a condition subsequent."
From the language last quoted, the court appears to assume that the
purchaser in such a transaction has an "estate" of some sort. How-
ever, in view of the court's express disclaimer to decide the nature of
the interest conveyed, and the fact that even the reference to the
interest conveyed as an "estate" was unnecessary to the decision,
there seems little reason to believe the court will feel itself bound by
the technical implications of this language in future decisions.32 Sim-
ilarly, one may argue that the language first quoted above (see quota-
tion noted by footnote 30) is dictum in the case and may not bind the
court in future litigation. However, this language, and thus the opinion,
is of significance here in that the court appears to reaffirm the rules
from the Elmonte case.
Before entering upon a more detailed study of the above cases, it
may be well to consider how the problems with which we are concerned
will normally arise. Certainly the form of the particular instrument
will have much to do with the occurrence of these problems, as will
the apparent intent of the parties. An instrument that openly purports
to create a right of "profit" in standing timber will probably raise few
of the questions with which we are here concerned (as hereinafter more
fully discussed). However, the two types of instruments commonly
in use that do give rise to a flood of questions are the ones ordinarily
so Id. at 756, 252 P.2d at 245. Again (see note 27, supra) the court seems to imply
that a conveyance of timber to be removed immediately is not a conveyance of realty
but of personalty.
31 Id. at 757, 252 P.2d at 246.32 Also, the word estate is often used today in such a way as to be virtually synono-
mous with "interest," "right," and "title." BLAcK, LAw DicTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
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known as "timber deeds" and "timber sale contracts." In these the
grantor usually purports to convey all the standing timber (often lim-
ited by diameter, or the term "merchantable") on certain real property
to the purchaser and gives the purchaser a specified time in which to
remove it. At first glance this type of instrument would appear to
create a defeasible fee simple estate. In any event the parties' intent
seems to be to convey "title" to the timber. Can this be done? And if
it is possible to do so, would the parties eliminate much confusion and
resulting litigation by using the "profit" concept instead?
If the ordinary "timber deed" or "timber sale contract" conveys an
interest in real property, what is the nature of that interest? Is it a
fee simple estate, or a fee estate on a special limitation or condition
subsequent, or perhaps even an estate for years? A close examination
of these real property concepts reveals that the interest acquired by
the timber purchaser does not properly fall within any of them.
The property concept that does fit the ordinary timber transaction,
without the need of stretching or warping definitions, and through
which some logical treatment can be given to this area," is that of
"profit i prendre,"" the right to take a part of the soil or produce of
the land."5
The grantee of standing timber upon the land of another cannot
properly be said to hold a fee interest in same, whether or not the deed
contains language limiting the time for removal.3 Such an interest is
of course an estate in land, and therefore must consist of subject
matter capable of physical occupation and defense, and enduring for-
ever." Obviously, standing timber, which is sold to be cut and removed,
83 The application of the profit concept to timber transactions has been proposed in
several recent publications: Comment, 34 ORE. L. REv. 256 (1955), Note, 33 ORE. L.
REv. 301 (1954), "The Conveyancer" 19 AusT. L. J. 183 (1945).
34 The argument in support of this proposition was set forth at length in an excellent
article by Eugene Luccock, entitled "Timber Deeds-A Case For The Restatement of
the Law of Property" 20 WAsir. L. REV. 201 (1945). No attempt has been made herein
to fully restate the matters considered in Mr. Luccock's article. However, a brief state-
ment of the principal points involved may be of some aid.
For a general analysis of "profits" see 25 ORE. L. REv. 217 (1946). 1 TompsO N,
REA. PROPERTY §§260-271 (perm. ed. 1939).3 3 BLACK, LAw DIcnoNARY (4th ed. 1951).
86 Without express language stating that the right to remove the timber shall exist
in perpetuity the Washington court has many times held that the grantee shall have
only a reasonable time in which to remove the timber. See: Kalnoski v. Carlisle Lbr.
Co. 17 Wn.2d 662, 137 P2d 109 (1943), Hay v. Chehalis Mill Co. 172 Wash. 102, 19
P.2d 397 (1933), Nelson v. MeKinney 163 Wash. 529, 1 P.2d 876 (1931), McFadden v.
Allen-Nelson Mill Co. 150 Wash. 249, 272 Pac. 714 (1928), Morgan v. Veness Lbr. Co.
108 Wash. 674, 185 Pac. 607 (1919). In Hay v. Chehalis Mill Co. (supra) the court
went so far as to apply the "reasonable time" rule to a deed stating the grantee was to
have and to hold the timber "forever."
87 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 7, 9 (1936).
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does not fit this description. There is no defined space that can be
possessed or occupied by the purchaser. Thus the type of conveyance
posed in the France case 8 would not and could not grant a "fee simple"
estate in the timber, although it would be sufficient to create a perpetual
"eprofit" in the purchaser. The language of our supreme court in the
France case indicates that the interest the purchaser acquired by the
conveyance was a "profit," although the court never referred to it
specifically as such."
Nor does the purchaser under an ordinary "timber deed" or "con-
tract of sale" acquire an estate for years. The type of instrument that
would create this specific problem would be a conveyance of standing
timber in which the grantee is given a specified time (or reasonable
time) in which to remove it. For the reasons stated previously, such a
grantee cannot have an "estate" in the land or timber. Furthermore,
implicit in the nature of an estate for years is the notion that it will
be returned to the grantor (or his successors) at the end of the term.
Here, the very purpose of the interest created is to permit the destruc-
tion of the subject matter. In any event it may well be argued that what
does "revert," where the timber is not removed in the allotted time, is
not an "estate" but merely the unremoved timber. Also, an estate for
years is ordinarily defined as a possessory interest.40 The timber buyer
does not have such an interest in the timber. Either he or the land-
owner must necessarily have possession (actual or constructive) of
the land upon which the timber stands, and it seems that the landowner
has such possession, subject only to the buyer's right to come upon
the land and remove the timber.
For the same reasons a timber purchaser's interest cannot be an
estate subject to a condition subsequent or special limitation.
The interest that is ordinarily conveyed appears to fall easily within
the definition of the term "profit," and is thereby not an "estate" but
merely one of the total bundle of rights held by the "owner" of the
land. He has conveyed the right to cut and take away the timber.
After such a conveyance he is under a disability concerning that par-
38 France v. Deep River Logging Co. 79 Wash. 336, 140 Pac. 361 (1914).3 0 France v. Deep River Logging Co. 79 Wash. 336, 343, 140 Pac. 361, 363 (1914).
"This language [conveyance using the word 'forever'] points, we think, conclusively
to an intention on the part of the grantor to convey a continuing, perpetual right for
all time, to enter upon the land and remove the timber." This language is noteworthy
in that the court does not here use the term "profit" but clearly seems to be speaking
of one when talking of the ". . . right ... to enter upon the land and remove the timber."4 0 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 7, 9 (1936. See discussion, 25 ORE. L. REv. 217
(1946).
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ticular right. If the right is not exercised in the time agreed, it once
again becomes a part of the owner's total rights concerning his land,
not by virtue of any "reversion," as in the case of an estate, but merely
by virtue of the purchaser's failure to exercise his right within the
allotted time.,"
A profit a prendre is an interest in real property,42 and, of course,
the conveyance of it is a conveyance of an interest in real property.
Hence for an owner to assign his interest in a profit, he must neces-
sarily comply with the statute of frauds concerning conveyances of
realty.' 3
What effect would the adoption of the "profit" principle have upon
the existing Washington case law? As noted earlier there is language
in the two most recent Washington cases (Flmonte and Coleman) that
would not normally presage the announcement of the profit concept in
regard to timber transactions. However, this language, as was pointed
out, appeared as dicta and for that reason, would not prove an insur-
mountable hurdle for the court to cross. The results of both cases
would have been the same whether or not the court had indicated
adherence to the profit concept. The case of France v. Deep River
Logging Co. would not stand in the way of Washington's use of the
profit idea, because there the court, in effect, applied the concept. An
examination of these cases, and the others noted previously in this
article, indicates that on authority there is no compelling reason why
the profit concept cannot be applied and used by our supreme court
in appropriate timber sale cases in the future. Certainly there is
nothing in these cases that would indicate any danger for practitioners
who wish to use the profit idea in instruments drawn to convey interests
in standing timber.
Before any discussion of this subject may be closed, another area of
our state laws must be examined, i.e., the Sales Act." The applicability
41 This result appears to obtain in Washington whether the timber is classified as
realty or as personalty, as indicated by the language in the early case of Lehtonen v.
Marysville Water & Power Co. 50 Wash. 359, 97 Pac. 292 (1908) where the court said:
"Whether the reservation of the timber made it, in legal effect, personal property or
otherwise, makes no difference. It is immaterial what the theoretical character becomes.
The contract of reservation provides that it shall be removed within a given time. If
it was the intention of the parties that the timber might be removed after that time, the
limitation means nothing and was misleading. The clear, expressed intention is that
the timber shall be removed within the time stated. It follows, of course, that the
vendor had no right on the land to sever the timber from the land after the time limit."
Id. at 360, 97 Pac. at 293.
421 THomPsoN, REAL PRoPERTY § 264 (perm. ed. 1939). RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 5 (1936).
48 RCW 64.04.010-.020.
" RCW 63.04.
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of this statute to timber transactions apparently has been overlooked
by practitioners and courts in this state for many years. None of the
Washington cases decided since its adoption in 1925 has ever men-
tioned the Sales Act. 5 But even a brief examination of the wording
of Section 76 of that act indicates quite clearly that sales of standing
timber were meant to be included thereunder. This section defines
"goods" as follows:
".... all chattels personal other than things in action and money. The
term includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached
to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before
sale or under the contract of sale." (emphasis supplied) 48
Of course, one might argue that this section is only applicable to that
small number of timber sales where the purchaser is under a duty to
remove the timber (on the theory that this is what is meant by "under
the contract of sale"). Such an argument is obviously weak. It
might be argued that the drafters of the act had some other type of
transaction in mind and did not intend to include sales of standing
timber. This argument is also weak, particularly in view of the com-
ments of the best known authority on the subject (and one of the
principal draftsmen of the act), Professor Samuel Williston, who has
indicated quite clearly that the Sales Act was intended to include sales
of standing timber.48
If a sale of standing timber does come under the Sales Act, then it
seems clear that the timber must be classified as personalty.4 The
various statutes and cases relating to personal property would, there-
fore, control transactions involving such timber.5 0 Of course, if the
45 Three state cases and one federal case have been decided since that date in which
the court might have given consideration to the application of the Sales Act. Milwaukee
Land Co. v. Poe 31 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1929), State Finance Co. v. Hamacher 171
Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610 (1932), Elmonte Inv. Co. v. Schafer Bros. Logging Co. 192
Wash. 1, 72 P.2d 311 (1937), Coleman v. Layman 41 Wn.2d 753, 252 P.2d 244 (1953).
(However, the Milwaukee case involved a transaction that took place in 1921-24, prior
to the effective date of the Sales Act.)
43 RCW 63.04.010.4 7 Reid v. Kier 175 Or. 192, 152 P.2d 417 (1944).
48 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 62 (rev. ed. 1948).4 9 When the Uniform Sales Act was adopted in Washington (L. 1925, ch. 142) the
legislature entitled it "An Act Relating to Sales of Personal Property..."
The term "goods" used in Section 76 of the Sales Act is defined in BLACK, LAw
DICTIo NARY (4th ed. 1951), as follows: "The term 'goods' is not so wide as 'chattels,'
for it applies to inanimate objects, and does not include animals or chattels real, as a
lease for years of house or land, which 'chattels' does include." The definition in
BouvER's LAW DIcrIoNARY (Baldwin's ed. 1934) is virtually the same.
50 Some interesting problems might arise here with regard to the applicability of
the implied warranties of the Sales Act, contained in RCW 63.04.120-170. Would there
normally be an implied warranty of fitness for purpose, or of merchantability in the sale
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Sales Act does apply, then all the other requirements thereof must be
complied with; e.g., the goods must be ascertained, 1 or subsequently
appropriated to the contract, and the parties must intend that the
property in the timber should pass immediately, 2 or upon its later
appropriation to the contract.
Two states have recently considered the question of the applica-
bility of Section 76 of the Sales Act to timber transactions. The Oregon
Supreme Court has stated that "The Uniform Sales Act relating to
personal property does not apply to standing timber.""3 The California
District Court of Appeal, Third District, also recently considered the
applicability of the Sales Act definition of "goods" to sales of standing
timber and said, "However, the... [Sales Act definition of goods] ...
is in our opinion quite clear and explicit, and regardless of what the
rule is elsewhere, we are satisfied that as to those claiming under or
by reason of a contract of sale, the California rule is that where stand-
ing timber is purchased separately from the land for the purpose of
severance, it must thereafter be considered as "goods" or personal
property.)"54
There is, however, one limitation on the applicability of the Sales
Act that may be forcibly argued. Section 76 does not expressly limit
the term "goods" to timber that is to be removed "immediately." How-
ever, Professor Williston has set forth an argument in favor of such a
limitation as follows:
In England the law has gone to great length in supporting the validity
of an oral contract to sell standing trees. In Marshall v. Green [1CPD
35], there was an oral sale of thirty-two trees 'to be got away as soon
as possible'. After six of the trees had been cut down the seller counter-
manded the sale, but the buyer continued to cut, and the action was
brought by the seller because of this. The court held that 'where the
of standing timber? They might, of course, be eliminated by an express disclaimer, or
by custom in the trade.
51 RCW 63.04.180.
52RCW 63.04.190.
53 Seguin v. Maloney-Chambers 198 Or. 272, 253 P.2d 252, 258 (1953) petition for
rehearing denied, 256 P.2d 514. The Oregon court cited the earlier case of Reid v.
Kier 175 Or. 192, 152 P.2d 417 (1944). But at the most the Reid case stands for the
proposition only that the Sales Act does not apply where the purchaser of standing
timber has merely the right, as opposed to a duty, to remove the timber.
54 Palmer v. Wahler 133 Cal. App. 2d 705, 285 P.2d 8, 12 (1955). The California
court did not cite cases from Oregon or any other jurisdiction in arriving at this con-
clusion. Reliance was placed solely on the language of the California Civil Code §§ 658
and 660. These sections contain language identical to Section 76 of the Uniform
Sales Act. The rule announced in Palmer v. Wahler was approved in Ascherman v.
McKee (Dist. Court of Appeals, 3d dist., July 18, 1956) 299 P.2d 367, and Crag
Lumber Company v. Crofoot (Dist. Court of Appeals, 3d Dist., Oct. 1, 1956, as modi-
fied on denial of rehearing Oct. 26, 1956) 301 P.2d 952, 966.
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thing sold is to derive no benefit from the land, and it is to be taken
away immediately, the contract is not for an interest in land.' Since
part of the trees had been taken away the section of the statute relating
to goods was satisfied and the bargain was held to be enforceable. The
same doctrine has prevailed in several of the United States, prior to the
passage of the Sales Act, [citing cases] and, though 'the courts of most
of the American States that have considered the question [have held]
expressly that a sale of growing or standing timber is a contract con-
cerning an interest in land,' [citing cases] the Sales Act, copying as it
has, the definition of 'goods' so far as concerns this question, from the
English statute, has adopted the English rule that any growing object
attached to the soil is to be treated as goods, if by the terms of the
contract it is to be immediately severed. Although the statute does not
in terms require prompt severance, it is reasonable to imply this require-
ment, since the English Act was intended to state previously existing
law, which was expressed in the quotation above from Marshall v.
Green, [supra], and the words of the American statute are identical
with those of the English Act.55
Obviously such an argument is of questionable applicability in Wash-
ington where our legislature made no express limitation in the Sales
Act itself, and where the legislative journals do not indicate that such
a limitation was intended.
However, if this limitation were to be applied in Washington, then
the applicability of the Sales Act to timber transactions would cause
little change in the basic rules set forth in the Elmonte case. These
rules provide essentially that standing timber sold separately from the
land shall remain realty unless sold with the intention of an immediate
severance. This is virtually the same statement that is made in the
"Williston" limitation of the Sales Act. Strangely, the authority for
the rule of the Elmonte case did not come from the Sales Act, but from
an early Kentucky case 5 (in spite of the fact that the gist of it had
been stated in two prior Washington cases,5" which were not cited).
The same rule has been adopted in a number of other states without the
benefit of the Sales Act.5Y
5 1 WI.LISTON SALES § 62 (rev. ed. 1948). This view is not without dissent.
6 CORNELL L. Q. 426 (1921).16 Gabbard v. Sheffield 179 Ky. 442, 200 S.W. 940, 15 A.L.R. 1 (1918). This case
has been followed in later Kentucky cases. See Cheatham v. Head 203 Ky. 489, 262
S.W. 622 (1924), Patton v. Lucy 285 Ky. 694, 148 S.W.2d 1039, 7 A.L.R.2d 524
Metcalf 372, 83 Am. Dec. 481 (1863) where the court cited 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDEnCE§ 271 as authority and stated the rule adopted was in accord with the then weight of
authority.
U Somers Co. v. Pix 75 Wash. 233, 134 Pac. 932 (1913), France v. Deep River
Logging Co. 79 Wash. 336, 342, 140 Pac. 361, 363 (1914).58 Erskine v. Plummer 7 Me. 447, 22 Am. Dec. 216 (1831), Leonard v. Medford 85
Md. 666, 37 Atl. 365, 37 L.R.A. 449 (1897), Wade v. Day 232 Mich. 458, 205 N.W. 225
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If the timber becomes personalty where the parties intend an imme-
diate severance, (under either of the above arguments) there still
remain a number of questions that must be considered. Must the
conveyance in such a case comply with the statute of frauds concern-
ing conveyances of real property? It would seem not. However, an
argument to the contrary can be made that although the purchaser
receives the timber as personal property, nevertheless the seller sold
an interest in his realty, i.e., the timber was realty at the instant of the
sale and did not become personalty until the sale was fully consum-
mated, and thus the transaction comes under the real property statute
of frauds.
Will the purchaser, to protect himself, be required to record such an
instrument as a conveyance of realty? RCW 65.08.070 provides for
the recording of conveyances of real property and provides that if such
conveyances are not so recorded they are "void as against any subse-
quent purchaser or mortgagee in good faith and for a valuable consid-
eration from the same vendor, his heirs, or devisees, of the same real
property or any portion thereof whose conveyance is first duly
recorded." If the conveyance of standing timber to be severed imme-
diately is not a conveyance of real property then the recording of such
a conveyance would not be notice to subsequent purchasers or mort-
gagees in good faith. This would seem to be a rather impracticable
and harsh result. There are, however, two approaches that might bring
such a transaction within this statute. First, the court might hold that
there is a constructive severance only between the parties to the trans-
action and that as to all third persons, or at least all other persons not
having actual notice of the transaction, it would be construed as being
a conveyance of realty and thus within the real property recording
statutes. Another approach, mentioned in the last paragraph above,
would be to say that although the purchaser receives the timber as
personal property, nevertheless the seller sold an interest in his realty,
i.e., the timber was realty at the instant of the sale and did not become
personalty until the sale was fully consummated.
Presumably once the instrument of conveyance was recorded in the
real property records, the whole world would then have notice of the
(1925), Rankin v. Ridge 53 N.M. 33, 201 P.2d 359 (1948), Robbins v. Farwell 193 Pa.
37, 44 Ati. 260 (1899), West Lumber Co. v. C. R. Cummings Export Co. (Tex. Civ.
App.) 196 S.W. 546 (1917), Hurricane Lumber Co. v. Lowe 110 Va. 380, 66 S.E. 66(1909), Norton v. Green 94 Vt. 295, 111 Atl. 458 (1920). See also: Annot. 7 A.L.R.2d
517 (1948), 54 C.J.S. Logs & Logging § 11 (1948), 1 WILLISTON, SATEs § 62 (rev. ed.
1948). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 200 also states substantially the same rule in defin-
ing "goods" as covered by the statute of frauds set out therein at § 178.
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constructive severance, and thus a subsequent conveyance of the timber
by the grantee could be treated for notice purposes as a conveyance of
personalty.
If the instrument in question uses the words "right away," is this
the same as saying "immediately"? What of such phrases as "reason-
able time," "as soon as possible," "as soon as reasonably able," "as
soon as practicable," "without delay," "diligently," etc.? In particular,
is "immediately" really something different from "reasonable time"?
5
"
If so, it follows that the parties must intend that the purchaser will cut
and remove the timber faster than at a "reasonable" pace; does this
mean the purchaser must cut and remove at an "unreasonably fast"
pace? One needs but a moment of reflection to see that such phrases
pose very difficult problems in the construction of instruments.
Or what if the instrument provides that the timber shall be removed
within a stated period, e.g., one year, but the tract is so large and so
inaccessible that the purchaser will necessarily have to move with the
utmost speed if he is to remove the timber within the allotted time?
In such a case the question arises whether the intent of the parties (re
"immediate severance") may not be entirely set forth in the instrument.
Even if the instrument states the amount of timber involved, the court
will still have too little before it from the instrument alone to ascertain
whether the time for removing the timber is so short as to require the
purchaser to act "immediately." The court obviously cannot take
judicial notice of all the facts necessary to make this determination.
May the parties bring in parol evidence to prove whether or not the
stated time is short, thereby requiring removal "immediately"? Cer-
tainly a strong argument can be made that where the instrument does
not completely answer this question, parol evidence should be per-
mitted.c" However, permitting parol evidence on this question will not
give certainty to this field of the law. Anyone desiring, for one reason
or another, to know whether the timber in question is real or personal
property will not be able to make that determination from the instru-
ment but must also examine the property, etc., and then make a most
difficult "value judgment" on the question.
59 As noted above (quotation from Elmonte case cited in notes 26 and 27), in Wash-
ington the timber remains realty where it is to be removed within a "reasonable" time.
However, the opposite result was reached in Kentucky where the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky said "immediate" includes a "reasonable" time. Patton v. Lucy 285 Ky. 694,
148 S.W.2d 1039, 7 A.L.R.2d 524 (1940). This would seem to include in Washington
those agreements where no time is stated, where the court has construed the parties to
mean a "reasonable" time.
80 Patton v. Lucy 285 Ky. 694, 148 S.W.2d 1039, 7 A.L.R.2d 524 (1940), Cheatham v.
Head 203 Ky. 489, 262 S.W. 622 (1924).
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Whether or not the court permits parol evidence on the issue of
"immediately," the question will nevertheless arise: how long can
"immediately" be? Even though the parties state in the instrument
that the timber is to be removed immediately, if the tract is large
enough, this could mean a period of many years. It is noteworthy that
in Kentucky, where the term "immediate" is similarly used in connec-
tion with such timber transactions, the Kentucky court has said"' that
immediate does not mean "at once", but as soon as is reasonable under
the circumstances, which includes the amount of timber, accessibility,
labor conditions, etc.
If the timber is not removed immediately, what becomes of it? Does
it revert to the status of realty?82 When does this change take place,
at the end of the period of time classified as "immediately" or at some
other time?
Not to be overlooked is the fact that many instruments do not create
in the purchaser any interest in the timber."5 They create only a con-
tract right in the purchaser to log the timber included in the agree-
ment."'
CONCLUSION
The present state of the law in Washington regarding timber
transactions is, to say the least, confusing. The rules set forth in the
Elmonte case and affirmed in the Coleman case raise countless ques-
tions for which there are no immediate answers. Then there is the
Sales Act. How does it fit into this difficult area? Or will our supreme
court reject it entirely? How? Greater understanding by the bar of
the myriad problems involved in the ordinary "timber deed" or "timber
sale contract" may aid in establishing some degree of rationality in this
field. A step in this direction will come from more general use of the
"profit" concept in connection with timber transactions, wherever
appropriate. Otherwise, careful draftsmanship will help to reduce the
problems that might ordinarily plague the seller or buyer of standing
timber.
61 See note 58, supra.
62 Bell County Land & Coal Co. v. Moss 30 Ky. 6, 97 S.W. 354 (1906). Held: the
timber reverts to the status of realty.
63 As to the nature of a contract purchaser's interest in real estate in Washington,
see cases collected and discussed in Comment, 22 WASH. L. REv. 110 (1947).64 Waples v. Sergeant 120 Wash. 63, 206 Pac. 945 (1922).
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